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I. INTRODUCTION
Rosa worked for her employer for less than six months before she was
fired.1 The employment description advertised for a nanny, but after just
two days on the job, her employer increased her responsibilities beyond
caring for his three daughters. In addition to caring for the girls, Rosa
was the driver and housekeeper for the entire family. Her hours were
long and some of her shifts extended overnight. Rosa was never
compensated for her out-of-pocket expenses: driving her own vehicle to
take the girls to their various after-school commitments; spending her
own money to buy the girls dinner; and spending her own money to
purchase cleaning supplies to clean her employer’s house. In fact, her
employer never paid her at all for the last two weeks of employment,
which included well over eighty hours of work.
In June of 2017, Rosa’s employer fired her for asking him to reimburse
her for her out-of-pocket expenses incurred while on the job. Not only
did he fire her and refuse to reimburse her, he outright refused to honor
his responsibility as an employer to pay his employee. Rosa did not waste
any time in seeking legal aid. Although she took a brave step in securing
help, she stopped pursuing recourse shortly after beginning the intake
process. “I do not want to get the police involved.” She admitted she
feared deportation. Her employer had already threatened to call
immigration officials if she insisted on recovering her wages.
Rosa’s experience of wage-theft is similar to that of most wage-theft
victims: employees are confronted with employers that retaliate upon
demand for payment.2 There are various avenues employees in Rosa’s
*
St. Mary’s University School of Law, Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2019; University
of Dallas, B.A., Political Philosophy and Spanish, May 2015. I would like to thank the Workers
Defense Project for their advocacy and efforts to help low-income employees of Texas recover
stolen wages. You taught me the mechanics, value, and power behind community organizing.
Special thanks to my parents for their unconditional love and support. My parents immigrated to
the United States over twenty-five years ago. Since, my mother has cleaned houses for a living and
my father works as a painter in the construction industry, and I am proud of these humble roots.
Finally, I dedicate this Comment to all the men and women who build our homes; clean our schools;
pick, cook, and serve our food; and labor in all low-income occupations: “There must be something
wrong with work, otherwise the rich would have taken it already.” —Mario “Cantinflas” Moreno
1. Rosa’s name has been changed to protect her identity.
2. See NIK THEODORE ET AL., WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, BUILD A BETTER SOUTH 13 (2017),
http://www.workersdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Build-a-Better-South-Full-ReportDigital.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG68-KE3X] [hereinafter THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER
SOUTH] (finding that several workers experienced retaliation in the form of getting laid-off,
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situation can take to recover their stolen wages, including filing wage
claims with the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of
Labor (DOL)3 or the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC).4
Additionally, law enforcement has the authority to arrest employers that
commit wage-theft without inquiring into the employee’s legal status.5
However, with the enactment of anti-immigration laws like Texas Senate
Bill 4 (S.B. 4), less wage-theft victims are willing to speak out against
employers that refuse to pay earned wages.6
In May of 2017, Governor Greg Abbot signed S.B. 4, more commonly
known as the “Show Me Your Papers” law.7 Thousands of members
from the community, half a dozen local governments, various community
organizations, and even law enforcement officials protested against S.B.
4, arguing the new law would make their cities more dangerous.8 They
reassignment, or with the threat of calling immigration officials if an attempt is made to recover
stolen wages).
3. Wage and Hour Division Mission Statement, WAGE & HOUR DIV.,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/mission/whdmiss.htm [https://perma.cc/9S8Y-C7G2] (last visited
April 11, 2018) [hereinafter WAGE & HOUR DIV., Mission Statement].
4. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 61.051 (2016) (providing employees subject to wage-theft with
administrative remedies). See also Employee Rights and Laws, TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N,
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/jobseekers/employee-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/EQF3-DRP6] (last
updated Apr. 19, 2017) [hereinafter TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N, Employee Rights and Laws].
5. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04 (2016); see also Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in
the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 665 (2014) (arguing police officers have
complete discretion in how they police; they have authority to either adopt policies that enforce
criminalization of wage-theft or avoid enforcing immigration laws altogether).
6. See Lee, supra note 5 (explaining the pressure from federal government to enforce
immigration laws combined with police departments’ willingness to comply has created a general
mistrust in police among the immigrant community, preventing undocumented workers from
reporting wage theft); see also Yomara Lopez, Empleadores Usan la Amenaza de la Deportación
Para No Pagar Salarios, TELEMUNDO (Aug. 16, 2017), http://telemundoaustin.com/news/local/
empleadores-usan-la-amenaza-de-la-deportacin-para-no-pagar-salarios [https://perma.cc/KW6LKZTT] (interviewing an undocumented construction worker in Texas who declined to call the
police after his employer threatened to lock him in the warehouse and call immigration officials if
the worker tried to recover a month’s worth of stolen wages).
7. S.B. 4, 85th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); Michael Barajas, Gov. Abbott Gleefully Signs
“Show Me Your Papers” Bill Into Law, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (May 8, 2017),
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2017/05/08/gov-abbott-gleefully-signs-show-meyour-papers-bill-into-law [https://perma.cc/Z92C-H84D] (describing Governor Abbott’s demeanor
as gleeful in the five minute live Facebook video stream where he publicly signed S.B. 4).
8. See Elvia Limón & Robert Wilonsky, Dallas Joins Fight Against Sanctuary Cities
Bill, DALL. MORNING NEWS, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas/2017/06/07/protesterstakesanctuary-cities-law-fight-dallas-city-hall [https://perma.cc/88AK-M5BJ] (last updated June 7,
2017) (summarizing the Dallas County Sherriff Department’s argument that S.B. 4 would create

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

3

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 20 [2018], No. 3, Art. 3

390

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 20:387

argued S.B. 4 discouraged undocumented immigrants from reporting
crime and participating in active investigations out of fear of being
deported.9 In City of El Cenizo v. Texas,10 six major cities, four counties,
six non-profit organizations, and six other plaintiffs in their official
capacity filed suit against Governor Greg Abbott, the State of Texas, and
other defendants, claiming S.B. 4 is unconstitutional.11
On August 30th, two days before S.B. 4 was due to take effect, Chief
Judge Orlando Garcia for the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas blocked portions of S.B. 4 with a preliminary
injunction.12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has since reviewed the District Court’s decision.13 In their September
2017 opinion, the Fifth Circuit largely denied defendants’ request, only
staying two of the five provisions of the injunction, but ultimately left the
most controversial provision of the law intact.14 Indeed, while many
celebrated the outcome, police officers are still legally permitted to ask
for proof of an individual’s legal status.15 Most recently, the Fifth

fear in the community and lead to an increase in unreported crimes); see also Renée Feltz, Texas
Police Say “Show Me Your Papers” Law is Damaging Public Safety – Before Even Taking Effect,
INTERCEPT (Aug. 3, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/08/03/texas-police-say-sb4-is-damaging
-public-safety-before-even-taking-effect/ [https://perma.cc/5ET5-7NRD] (describing the Houston
Police Department’s argument that S.B. 4 will increase crime rates because undocumented
immigrants will refuse to aid in police investigations by serving as trial witnesses; legal immigrants
will avoid contacting the police to protect undocumented family and friends; and fewer Hispanics,
in general, will report crime to avoid potential harassment by the police).
9. See Limón & Wilonsky, supra note 8 (citing Executive Chief Deputy’s, Jesse Flores
argument that the vulnerability of the undocumented community has increased because of S.B. 4—
especially for women and children—because undocumented immigrants are less likely to report
crimes out of fear of deportation).
10. 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) granting stay in part, 2017 WL 4250186 (5th
Cir. 2017).
11. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) granting stay in part,
2017 WL 4250186 (5th Cir. 2017).
12. Id. The original injunction prevented the state from enforcing § 752.053(b)(3) which
prohibits local entities form limiting or prohibiting persons with the authority to effect immigration
from assisting immigration officials; § 752.053(a)(1) which prohibits the endorsement of policies
that limit enforcement of immigration laws; § 752.053(a)(1) and § 752.053(a)(2)’s provisions
prohibiting the adoption of policies that limit the enforcement of immigration laws; and
§ 2.251(a)(1)which requires the fulfilment of any immigration retainer request sent to them by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)).
13. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, No. 17-50762, 2017 WL 4250186 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2017).
14. Id.
15. City of El Cenizo, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 808–09.
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Circuit’s May 2018 opinion held that with one exception,
§ 752.053(a)(1), S.B. 4 in its entirety is constitutional.16
One argument supporters of S.B. 4 advanced was that if there are less
undocumented immigrants in the United States as a result of the local
policy in enforcing immigration laws, there will be less crime.17 Among
the crimes usually hypothesized in this argument are homicide, sexual
assaults, and burglaries.18 While the potential of these crimes demands
attention, S.B. 4 supporters fail to recognize the negative effect S.B. 4
will have on one crime that is already underreported: wage-theft in lowincome occupations.19
Wage-theft persists in Texas because employers anticipate most of
their low-wage, undocumented workers are unlikely to report wage-theft
to local, state, or federal agencies.20 State and federal agencies have
implemented policies that clarify undocumented workers are legally
entitled to the same wage protections as documented workers.21
However anti-immigration laws make it easier for employers to abuse
16. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. May 8, 2018).
17. See Defendants’ Response to Applications for Preliminary Injunctions at 2, 73, City of
El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. SA17-CV-404-OLG) (blaming the
threat of crime on law enforcement’s failure to collaborate with immigration officials on deporting
undocumented immigrants).
18. See Id. at 2, (estimating over 220,000 undocumented immigrants have been charged
with 1,196 homicides, 6,274 sexual assaults, and 16,996 burglaries in the past six years).
19. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 12. See also Julien Ross,
A Fair Day’s Pay: The Problem of Unpaid Workers in Central Texas, 10 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y
117, 126 (2004) (warning that wage theft statistics can also be skewed by undocumented employees
that do not report wage claims because they fear deportation).
20. See Janice Fine & Gregory Lyon, Segmentation and the Role of Labor Standards
Enforcement in Immigration Reform, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 431, 432 (2017) (reporting
industries with the most wage theft violations nationwide are heavily populated by immigrant
employees); see also ANN BEESON ET AL., IMMIGRANTS DRIVE THE TEXAS ECONOMY:
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF IMMIGRANTS TO TEXAS 9 (Sept. 17, 2014), http://forabettertexas.org/
images/EO_2014_09_PP_Immigration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV8H-KY22]
(emphasizing
immigrant workers far outnumber native workers across industries in Texas including construction
trades, material handlers, food service, housekeeping, agriculture, and child care).
21. See Employment Rights of Undocumented Workers, TEX. L. HELP 3,
https://texaslawhelp.org/printpdf/1807 [https://perma.cc/Q9ZF-7TED] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018)
(noting undocumented workers are covered by the Texas Payday Law); see also Fact Sheet #48,
WAGE & HOUR DIV., https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.pdf [https://perma.cc/
47CR-2PLA] (last updated July 2008) [hereinafter WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #48]
(clarifying the DOL will enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which requires employers
to pay covered employees the federal minimum wage and time and a half for overtime hours,
despite the employees’ immigration status).
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their employees by stealing their wages and harder for labor agencies to
resolve the issue of wage-theft.22 Assuming workers know the DOL or
TWC were created to protect their labor rights,23 they still face many
barriers in trying to recover lost wages when seeking assistance from
either agency.24 In a workforce where the employer-employee
relationship already suffers from a substantive power imbalance, labor
agencies’ ability to protect workers from wage-theft is further reduced
while S.B. 4 remains in effect.25
Immigration laws significantly impact workplace conditions in lowwage occupations.26 While demand for skilled labor is increasing,27
anti-immigration legislation is also negatively effecting undocumented
immigrants, native, and naturalized workers in the workplace.28 The
22. See Lee, supra note 5, at 665 (using Arizona as an example for how a state’s antiimmigration laws can facilitate wage-theft and how the enlisting of local authorities to enforce
immigration laws created an environment of mistrust, thus isolating immigrants); see also Eric
Cortellessa, How Trump Made Wage Theft Routine, AM. PROSPECT (June 5, 2017),
http://prospect.org/article/how-trump-made-wage-theft-routine [https://perma.cc/2R2M-CFDA]
(blaming the Trump Administration’s anti-immigrant rhetoric for the restored fear in
undocumented workers reporting wage-theft); see also Lopez, supra note 6 (quoting a community
organizer estimating that over 50% of construction workers in Texas are undocumented and
employers exploit this to avoid having to pay employees).
23. See AMY PRICE ET AL., WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, BUILD A BETTER TEXAS 29 (2013),
http://www.workersdefense.org/Build%20a%20Better%20Texas_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
96WY-BKWQ] (estimating over half of employees in Texas’ construction industry have never
heard of the DOL or TWC).
24. Rita J. Verga, An Advocate’s Toolkit: Using Criminal “Theft of Service” Laws to
Enforce Workers’ Right to be Paid, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283, 286–89 (2005); see also Lee, supra
note 5, at 657 (describing existing federal and state channels for filing wage claims as confusing).
25. See Verga, supra note 24, at 286–89 (arguing federal and state wage protection laws
lack enforcement); THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 13 (listing
obstacles in recovering wages, like lengthy proceedings, cost, and difficulties in collecting actual
wages).
26. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 431–32 (suggesting that protecting immigrant rights
in the workplace creates an even playing field for all workers because it undercuts employers’
incentives to exploit workers—whether undocumented, native, or naturalized).
27. See U.S. CHAMBER COM., IMMIGRATION MYTHS AND FACTS (Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/022851_mythsfacts_2016_report_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR56-J3X2] (indicating the addition of immigrant workers to labor
market stimulates investment into the economy, thus increasing the demand for labor).
28. See BBVA RES., MEXICO MIGRATION OUTLOOK, 10–11 (Nov. 2010),
https://www.bbvaresearch.com/KETD/fbin/mult/1011_MigrationOutlookMexico_04_tcm348234630.pdf?ts=1372011 [https://perma.cc/FTU5-A67J] (attributing the cause of Mexican
migration to the United States to the U.S. economy’s demand for cheap labor); Erick C. Laque,
Immigration Law and Policy: Before and After September 11, 2001, 10 SOC. SCI. J. 25, 25 (2010).
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solution is to reform the structure of labor agencies to better enforce labor
laws, and to reform immigration laws resulting in a path toward
permanent legal status. Without a permanent solution to the worker’s
immigration status, employees like Rosa will remain vulnerable to the
threat of deportation in trying to recover lost wages.
II. WAGE-THEFT AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION
A. The Department of Labor and the Texas Workforce Commission
Protect Low-Income Workers from Wage-Theft
Wage-theft is the nonpayment of hours worked,29 including failure to
pay the minimum wage,30 overtime,31 work completed, the amount
promised, or failing to pay the worker at all.32 Wage-theft can also take
the form of paying an employee with a bad check33 or taking illegal
deductions from wages rightfully earned.34 Wage-theft is a crime for
which employers can be arrested and receive criminal penalties ranging
from a $500 fine to prison time.35 The Theft of Service Act permits
Texas law enforcement to investigate wage-theft claims.36 The State can
charge employers with theft of service if the employer intentionally or
knowingly agrees to pay for a service, but fails to pay once the service is
rendered.37
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2016) (establishing that hours worked will be used to measure
minimum wage and overtime). See also PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 (defining wage-theft);
THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 12 (defining wage-theft).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2016) (setting federal minimum wage at $7.25 an hour); see
also Texas Minimum Wage Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 65.051 (2016) (requiring employees
receive the federal minimum wage).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(C) (2016) (defining overtime compensation).
32. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(a)(4) (2016) (defining the crime of theft of service
as failure to pay in full); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(d-1)(2) (2016) (noting that
making a partial payment of wages is not a defense to negate theft of service).
33. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.06(a) (2016) (defining theft by check as the issuing of a
check for the payment of a service despite not having sufficient funds).
34. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 61.018 (2016) (limiting the only instances under which
deductions can be made, including when it is ordered by a court of jurisdiction, authorized by state
or federal law, or the employee has provided written authorization to the employee to deduct from
the wages for lawful purposes).
35. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.04(e) (2016) (categorizing offenses ranging from a Class
C misdemeanor to a first-degree felony).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Throughout the country, low-income occupations are riddled with the
problem of wage-theft.38 Some of the most common high-violation, lowincome industries include construction, restaurants, small home-care
facilities, retail, daycare, landscaping, agriculture, food manufacturing,
poultry processing, and building services like janitorial and custodial
employment.39 Historically, these industries were the main source of
income for middle class families.40 Prior to the turn of the century,
skilled employment in low-wage occupations was perceived as a “bad”
job.41 These industries suffer from a wide range of negative working
conditions that discourage younger generations from seeking
38. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS 2 (2009),
https://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/broken-laws-unprotected-workers/
[https://perma.cc/
9T47-UDNM] (reporting on recent working conditions in 28 low-income occupations in Chicago,
Los Angeles, and New York, including restaurants, hotels, private households, apparel and textile
manufacturing, retail, and drug stores where 26% of workers surveyed were not paid minimum
wage and 76% were not paid overtime); see also BLS REPORTS, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM
WAGE WORKERS, 2016, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 8 tbl.3 (Apr. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/
opub/reports/minimum-wage/2016/pdf/home.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7VP-T5F5] (highlighting
Texas as having the largest number of workers paid below the minimum hourly wage).
39. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432(drawing a correlation between high-violation
industries and those that are most heavily populated with immigrant workers); DAVID WEIL ET AL.,
IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 2 fig.A.1 (May
2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y43F5QQ9] (listing these industries as “priority industries” where the WHD and DOL should focus their
efforts to enforce compliance with wage laws); BLS REPORTS, supra note 38 (listing industries
with most frequent minimum wage hourly rate, indicating the restaurant and retail industries had
the most minimum wage violations in 2016).
40. See THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 15 (describing how
construction jobs used to be “good” blue-collar jobs when formal training programs educated
workers and opportunities for advancement in the industry were plentiful); see also ROBERT I.
LERMAN & STEFANIE R. SCHMIDT, URBAN INST. FOR U.S. DEP’T LABOR, AN OVERVIEW OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AFFECTING THE US LABOR MARKET 79 (Aug.
1999),
https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/herman/reports/futurework/conference/
trends/trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82Z-SNH2] (dating labor shortages in low-income
occupations as early as the 1970s, growing rapidly into the early 1990s, and stabilizing thereafter
as workers returned to similarly-skilled occupations).
41. See generally Chinhui Juhn et al., Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill, 101
J. POL. ECON. 410, 411–12 (1993) (proposing wage trends follow industrial trends favoring highskilled employees); see also THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 2
(explaining a relatively recent decrease in middle-wage jobs led to an increase in wage disparity
between low-income and high-income jobs); Stephen Moore, The Great Worker Shortage, FORBES
(Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemoore/2015/03/31/not-hard-at-work-hardlyworking/#4cbb030ba62e [https://perma.cc/952Z-AKMT] (listing one cause of labor shortages is a
lack of skilled employees ready to work; many believe blue-collar jobs do not lead to middle class
income).
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employment, including health and safety violations that create a
dangerous working environment, lack of employment benefits, and few
opportunities for advancement.42
The construction industry in particular suffers from poor working
conditions.43 Texas has the fastest growing housing market44 and the
largest general construction market in the nation.45 The 2010 U.S.
Census estimated that over 952,000 Texans worked in the construction
industry.46 Texas’s workforce is estimated at 12.6 million, indicating
roughly one of every thirteen workers is employed in the construction
industry.47 However some sources indicate these numbers may be larger
due to the underrepresented undocumented immigrant population living
in the shadows.48

42. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432–33 (listing working conditions for immigrants
in low-wage occupations across the United States); see THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER
SOUTH, supra note 2, at 11–16 (summarizing working conditions in the South’s construction sector
and describing it as unstable work). But see Moore, supra note 41 (arguing blue-collar jobs can
place employees and their families in middle and higher socioeconomic classes). Stephen Moore,
however, only references highly skilled trades, like welders and technicians, while the majority of
construction jobs have a poor reputation, particularly among graduating high school students
because of the decrease in “good” jobs with benefits. See, e.g., PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 28
(citing a high injury rate, lack of benefits, low wages, and no training as deterrents for entry into
the construction industry).
43. See Ross, supra note 19, at 129 (citing statistics from the Project Wage Claim
survey of low-wage workers in Austin from August 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003, that revealed 70%
of wage claims were from the construction industry, demonstrating that the problem of wage theft
is long standing); see also AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 9 (Apr. 2016),
https://aflcio.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/1647_DOTJ2016_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D6X2SLH] (finding that of the 3,846 workplace inspection conducted in 2015, well over half were
related to construction).
44. Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 433 (stating “[o]ne in 13 workers in Texas is employed
in the construction industry” and Texas issues “more new housing construction permits . . . than
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Illinois combined.”).
45. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at i (acknowledging that despite the 2008 recession, the
Texas construction industry fared better than the U.S. construction industry with respect to the rate
of employment).
46. Id. at i, vi n.8.
47. Id. at vi n.8.
48. See ROBERT JUSTICH & BETTY NG, THE UNDERGROUND LABOR FORCE IS
RISING TO THE SURFACE 2 (2005), http://www.respectwashington.us/studies-and-reports/
BearStearnsUnderground.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEN2-BE4K] (noting the number of
undocumented immigrants was not properly estimated by the 2000 U.S. Census largely due to
undocumented immigrants’ non-responsiveness).
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One-fourth of all Texas construction workers are based out of the
Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex.49 In Dallas alone, 30% of construction
workers surveyed in 2017 experienced wage-theft in the form of not
getting paid overtime, not getting paid at all, or both.50 This number
reflects an increase in the number of workers who experienced wage-theft
because the State’s average in 2013 was 20% of 1,194 workers surveyed
in Austin, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and El Paso.51
While reports indicate an increase in the number of employees
experiencing wage-theft, the most common proposed solution to the
problem is the improvement of existing polices.52 There are two
agencies assigned to address wage-theft: (1) the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor (DOL),53 and (2) the Texas Workforce
Commission (TWC).54 Under each agency, different laws were designed
to provide relief for victims of wage-theft.55 The DOL enforces the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which protects the employee’s right to
receive minimum wage and overtime.56 For example, if Rosa’s
employer hired her for $9.95 an hour to watch his children57 and she
decided to file a wage claim with the DOL, FLSA would only protect her

49. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 30.
50. Id. at 32.
51. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 5, 46.
52. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432 (listing solutions, including increased penalties
for workplace violations, strategic targeting of high violation industries, and an increase in
resources for agencies enforcing labor standards in the form of more investigators and coenforcement by the state and the industry); see also THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH,
supra note 2, at xi (reiterating the agencies who enforce this legislation lack funding despite wholly
existing to protect workers.) This lack of funding stifles the legislation’s efficiency, limits
involvement from local municipalities, and creates a void between policymakers and community
organizations. Id.
53. WAGE & HOUR DIV., Mission Statement, supra note 3.
54. TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N, Employee Rights and Laws, supra note 4.
55. Ross, supra note 19, at 133 (listing Texas contract law, unjust enrichment doctrine, and
the Mechanic’s and Materialman’s Lien provisions as other methods employees can recover lost
wages under).
56. WAGE & HOUR DIV., Mission Statement, supra note 3.
57. See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2016, 39-9011 Childcare Workers,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes399011.htm [https://perma.cc/H42DKC46] (last updated Mar. 31, 2017) (estimating the average Texas childcare workers earned $9.95
in 2016).
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right to $7.25 per hour.58 In effect, Rosa would not be able to recover
the remaining $216 through her FLSA claim, based on a forty-hour work
week paid every two weeks. Additionally, if she wanted to file a claim
for her overtime pay, FLSA would only allow her to recover up to
$10.8859 instead of the $14.93 she would have been entitled to
otherwise.60
The TWC enforces the Texas Minimum Wage Act which, in part,
ensures employees receive the federal minimum wage.61 TWC also
enforces the Texas Payday Law.62 The Texas Payday Law further
outlines when employees should be paid, proper notice of paydays, form
and delivery of payment, and allowable deductions.63 While FLSA
could protect Rosa’s right to earn the federal minimum wage, the Texas
Minimum Wage Act could not because it exempts employees that provide
domestic services in a private home.64
In spite of resources provided by the DOL and TWC, few low-wage
workers are even aware these resources exist to protect their labor
rights.65 In 2013, 63% of construction workers surveyed in Texas
reported they had never heard of the DOL; 77% reported the same with
respect to the TWC.66 One of the reasons workers have never heard of
these two agencies is lack of the agencies’ presence. For example, TWC
does not conduct field investigations, making it less likely workers will
come into personal contact with representatives from the commission.67

58. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2016) (allowing employees to
recover under FLSA for a maximum of the federal minimum wage, which is currently $7.25, for
regular hours worked).
59. See id. (calculating overtime based on federal minimum wage, thus currently capping
overtime wages at $10.88).
60. See id. (allowing for liquidated damages equal to the minimum or overtime wages
granted, and attorney’s fees).
61. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 62.051 (2016).
62. Id. § 61.011.
63. Id. §§ 61.011–61.018.
64. Id. § 62.154 (exempting some forms of domestic employment from the minimum wage
provisions).
65. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 29.
66. Id.
67. See Ross, supra note 19, at 150–51 (describing the TWC wage claim procedure, and
noting that it is solely based on written correspondence and some phone communication between
the parties and the investigator); see also PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 30 (describing the
procedure as inadequate because the TWC has to rely solely on the written complaint).
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The TWC limits their investigation to the worker’s filed complaint; any
possible future communication with either the employer or employee, (or
both) is likewise limited to an “as needed” basis.68 In contrast from the
TWC, the DOL is authorized to perform field investigations.69 Still, the
few workers who confront employers by filing complaints with either the
DOL or TWC generally face long and expensive court proceedings,
disappearing employers that fail to respond, and difficulties in actually
collecting unpaid wages despite receiving a favorable judgement from
one of the two agencies.70
Wage-theft is a serious threat to the livelihoods of workers that are
already receiving below living wages.71 Although there are expensive
consequences and criminal convictions for committing wage-theft,
employers have little incentive to stop because penalties are rarely
imposed.72 Present labor laws fail to protect a large, vulnerable sector of
the population employed in low-income occupations.73 Indeed, wagetheft is one of the key reasons low-wage workers are struggling in today’s
economy.74

68. How to Respond to a Wage Claim Under Texas Payday Law, TEX. WORKFORCE
COMM’N, http://www.twc.state.tx.us/businesses/how-respond-wage-claim-under-texas-paydaylaw#wageClaimInvestigationProcess [https://perma.cc/NK9V-HGNX] (last updated Nov. 10,
2017).
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2016) (allowing onsite investigations in violations of FLSA
provisions); Oklahoma Press Publ Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1946) (discussing the
DOL’s authority to conduct investigations into alleged FLSA violations, “[i]t is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command.”);
see also Ross, supra note 19, at 156 (noting the ability to field investigations as one of the few
advantages an employee’s wage claim receives if filed with the WHD instead of the TWC).
70. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 13; see Ross, supra note
19, at 151 tbl.4.3 (showing the time elapsed from file date to action in a TWC wage claim process).
71. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 18 (stating “[f]ifty-two percent of workers surveyed
were found to be earning wages that placed them below the federal poverty line.”).
72. See id. at 30 (noting the TWC can fine employers who fail to pay their workers up to
$1,000, but rarely impose any fine at all); see also Priscila Mosqueda, El Paso Becomes Second
City to Indict Employer for Wage Theft, TEX. OBSERVER (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.texasobserver.org/el-paso-becomes-second-city-to-indict-employer-for-wage-theft/
[https://perma.cc/R6WM-Z798] (identifying only two employers arrested for wage-theft in the
entire state of Texas after two years of amending the Theft by Service Act in 2011).
73. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 30–31 (estimating about
20% of Dallas households are living below the poverty line and identifying Dallas construction
workers as some of the city’s poorest residents).
74. See Id. at 30 (identifying wage-theft and lack of benefits as two main issues construction
workers face).
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B. Undocumented Workers Are Legally Entitled to the Same Wage
Protections as Documented Workers
Besides facing administrative hurdles, many workers experience
employer retaliation by firing or reassignment to a less favorable position
as a result of claiming stolen wages.75 Undocumented workers face a
more alarming form of retaliation: employers threaten to call or actually
do call immigration services.76 The DOL and the TWC maintain polices
to protect undocumented workers’ labor rights, including the right to
minimum wage and overtime.77 However, without legal status in this
country, undocumented workers are more likely to experience wage-theft
than any other group of low-wage workers.78
In 2011, the DOL and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
addressed the importance of securing the right to proper wages in light of
anti-immigrations statutes in the Revised Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning
Enforcement Activities at Worksites (MOU).79 The purpose of the
memorandum was to reach a compromise that would ensure immigrant
workers’ safety in filing complaints regarding working conditions
without fear of reprisal.80 The DOL’s concern was that too many
employers were avoiding workplace complaints because they were
reporting their employees to immigration services and DHS was actually

75. Id.
76. See id. at 13 (indicating the threat of deportation is an exceedingly coercive measure
used on undocumented workers); Luz M. Molina et al., Vulnerabilities of Low-Wage Workers and
Some Thoughts on Improving Workplace Protections: the Experience of the Workplace Justice
Project, 17 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 215, 225–26 (2016) (describing the employer’s knowledge of the
undocumented worker’s immigration status as a “weapon of intimidation” that is used to commit
wage-theft in the first place and then used to keep the worker from reporting the crime).
77. See TEX. L. HELP, supra note 21 (noting undocumented workers are covered by the
Texas Payday Law); see also WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #48, supra note 21 (clarifying the
DOL will enforce FLSA, requiring employers to pay covered employees the federal minimum wage
and time and a half for overtime hours, despite the employees’ immigration status).
78. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 433 (estimating undocumented workers in
construction occupations are two and a half times more likely to fall victims of wage-theft).
79. U.S. DEP’T LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
AT
WORKSITES
(2011),
https://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB4Z-PQXG] [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING].
80. Id.
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responding to the reports.81 Sure enough, a large majority of unpaid
overtime and other wage-theft violations occurred in industries populated
with immigrant workers.82 Since the Texas construction industry is
made up of over 40% foreign-born employees, there is an out-sized
danger for retaliation in the form of immigration threats.83 In Dallas and
Houston, 63% and 77% of the workers in the construction industry,
respectively, are foreign-born.84
Among the twelve commitments the DHS and DOL agreed to include,
one was a promise from ICE to refrain (with few exceptions) from
conducting civil worksite enforcement activities if an existing DOL
investigation is pending.85 Another concerned better communication.
Specifically, ICE promised to inform the DOL when employers or their
surrogates report immigration violations to avoid a pending labor
dispute.86 Ultimately, the DHS agreed to not assist employers attempting
to manipulate ongoing labor disputes by tipping off immigration officials
to their workers’ immigration statutes.87
The MOU between DHS and DOL was amended in 2016.88 At that
time the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
81. See id. (“The parties further recognize that effective enforcement of both labor- and
immigration-related worksite laws requires that the enforcement process be insulated from
inappropriate manipulation by other parties.”).
82. Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432 (estimating, in 2010, over 50% of all workers born
in Mexico and Central America were employed in “high-violation industries”).
83. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 10, 24 (profiling one construction worker’s
experience of being threatened by his employer with a call to immigration when he demanded to
be paid earned wages).
84. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 30, 32 (reporting that in
both cities, at least 50% of foreign-born construction workers are from Mexico).
85. See U.S. DEP’T LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 79
(including three exceptions: (1) when the Director or Deputy Director of ICE decides that the
enforcement activity is necessary in support of an investigation regarding national security, the
protection of vital infrastructure, such as ports and power plants, or a federal crime other than
unauthorized employment; (2) when the Secretary of Homeland Security directs the enforcement
activity; or (3) when the Secretary of Labor, Solicitor of Labor, or another DOL official designated
by the Secretary of Labor requests the enforcement activity).
86. Id.
87. NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. & NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, Immigration and Labor
Enforcement in the Workplace: The Revised DOL-DHS Memorandum of Understanding
2011, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DHS-DOL-MOU-nelpnilc-2011-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38BQ-57X3] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
88. U.S. DEP’T LABOR, ADDENDUM TO THE REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were added as parties.89 The
addendum extended the DOL’s commitment to refrain from conducting
civil worksite enforcement activities where an existing DOL
investigation is pending to include worksites where an EEOC or NLRB
investigation is pending.90 The addendum also protects workers that
attempt to unionize and undocumented workers who file claims of
discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, religion,
disability, and age.91
C. Wage-Theft in Low-Wage Occupations in Arizona During
the Enactment of Senate Bill 1070
On April 23, 2010, Arizona’s state legislature passed the Arizona
Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070), broadening the immigration enforcement
powers of Arizona’s local police.92 The anti-immigration law was
designed to discourage the entry and presence of undocumented
immigrants in Arizona.93 In United States v. Arizona,94 the Federal
District Court for the District of Arizona enjoined several provisions
related to undocumented immigrants, including § 2(B), which required
officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to verify the person’s
immigration status with ICE; § 3, which criminalized mere presence in
the state of Arizona as a misdemeanor; § 5(C), which criminalized
seeking or obtaining employment as a misdemeanor; and § 6, which
authorized warrantless arrests so long as the officer had probable cause

ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/MOU-Addendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB4D-ZB33].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (explaining the EEOC investigations include the authority to enforce Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title I and V of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Title II of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008; and that the NLRA investigations include the authority to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act).
92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010); Andrea Christina Nill, Comment, Latinos
and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 35, 35 (2011).
93. See
S.B.
1070,
49th
Leg.
2d
Reg.
Sess.
(Arix.
2010),
https://www.azleg.gov/alispdfs/council/SB1070-HB2162.PDF
[https://perma.cc/58JZ-PDEG]
(stating the intent of S.B. 1070 outlined in section 1 of the bill).
94. 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
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to believe the detainee committed an offense that made the detainee
removable from the county.95
However, in Arizona v. United States,96 the Supreme Court upheld the
most controversial provision, § 2(B), allowing police officers to enforce
immigration laws at their discretion by asking individuals they stop,
detain, or arrest for their “papers.”97 The Court held it was improper to
enjoin § 2(B) because there are three independent limitations that would
prevent law enforcement from solely applying immigration laws at their
discretion: 1) the presumption that a detainee is lawfully present if the
detainee presents a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar
identification; 2) the restriction prohibiting officers from considering
race, color or national origin beyond what the United States Constitution
and Arizona Constitution permit; and 3) the requirement to enforce
immigration laws in a manner consistent with federal law.98 The first
limitation relied on the fact that by 2010, Arizona had passed a law
limiting the issuance of Arizona driver’s licenses and identification cards
to people in the country lawfully.99 Presumably, the second and third
limitations prevent discretionary enforcement of immigration laws
because of federal considerations. In any event, not all officer-civilian
encounters require a person to present a valid Arizona driver’s license,
particularly when this type of demand unnecessarily extends certain
routine encounters.100
The Court went on to address two concerns mentioned by the United
States. First, regarding the provision requiring law enforcement to verify
immigration status of individuals stopped, detained, or arrested, the Court
argued Congress encouraged information sharing about possible

95. See id. (“[C]hallenging constitutionality of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act, requiring, inter alia, that police officers check a person’s immigration
status under certain circumstances.”).
96. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
97. Id. at 411–15.
98. Id. at 411.
99. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3158 (2018) (requiring driver’s license and instruction
permit applicants “shall give the department satisfactory proof of the applicant’s full legal name,
date of birth, sex[,] and residence address and that the applicant’s presence in the United States is
authorized under federal law.”).
100. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413–14 (using jaywalking as an example of the low likelihood
of law enforcement performing immigration status checks that only prolong the encounter).
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immigration violations.101 Therefore, according to the Court, there is
room in the federal scheme for a policy requiring law enforcement to
verify immigration status with ICE.102 The second concern brought up
by the United States was the delay of release from a stop, detainment, or
arrest for the sake of verifying immigration status.103 The government
argued that as a result of § 2(B)’s mandatory verification, officers would
prolong detainments solely to verify immigration status.104 However,
the Court justified the provision by pointing out it was too early to
determine whether this would actually occur.105
Prolonged detentions are occurring. According to a review of officers
from the Tuscan Police Department conducted by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Arizona from June 2014 to December 2015,
more than 75% of stops involved either a clear violation or potential
violation of constitutional rights.106 All of these stops led to prolonged
detentions due to efforts made to communicate with Border Patrol, many
of which resulted in false “hits” that the person was undocumented when
they were actually lawfully present.107 Although many of the reviewed
incidents were routine traffic stops that would typically result in a release,
the stops lasted an average of one and a half hours.108
Additionally, S.B. 1070 had a devastating effect in the workplace.109

101. See id. at 412 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A), which prohibits restricting
communication between local government and ICE regarding immigration status of individuals).
102. See id. at 411–15 (implying that because Congress is silent on the issue, there is a
possibility of collaboration between local law enforcement and ICE).
103. Id. at 413.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 414.
106. See Letter from James Lyall, Staff Att’y, ACLU of Ariz., to Chris Magnus,
Chief of Police, Tucson Police Dep’t (May 2, 2016) (on file with ACLU Arizona),
https://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/aclu_ltr_to_tpd_chief_magnus_re_107
0_enforcement_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP5H-XHL3] (citing specific instances within 110 police
stops where individual rights were violated).
107. See id. (describing the process after individuals were picked up by police at traffic
stops).
108. See id. (detailing the lengthy process individuals at traffic stops undergo as police
officers try to determine whether they are in the United States illegally).
109. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 5, at 664–65 (discussing the difficulties of policing
wage-theft after enactments of anti-immigrant policies like S.B. 1070, among others). See
generally BBVA RES., supra note 28 (detailing the effects of S.B. 1070 on the labor market, the
economic contribution of immigrants, and the general negative effects on the integral Mexican
immigrant community in Arizona); see also Alex Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against
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Wage-theft in Arizona increased after the enactment of S.B. 1070.110
The law further pushed undocumented workers into the shadows for fear
of deportation if they fought to have their labor rights respected.111 Not
only were victims of wage-theft unlikely to report workplace violations,
the undocumented community across the United States was largely
unwilling to even campaign for better working conditions despite the fact
that S.B. 1070-type laws had not been enacted in every state.112
More significantly, the law pushed many undocumented workers and
employers out of the state of Arizona all together; the former from fear
of deportation and the latter from labor shortages.113 One report
estimated the number of Hispanics in Arizona at 100,000 fewer after the
enactment of S.B. 1070 compared to the number of Hispanics at the
beginning of 2010.114 Between the time when the Arizona Legislature
passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)115 in 2007 and the
Supreme Court’s ruling upholding controversial provisions of S.B. 1070
Arizona’s Immigration Laws, 709 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (Sept. 25, 2012), https://object.
cato.org/pubs/pas/PA709.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ED4-PCPF] [hereinafter Nowrasteh, The
Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws] (detailing the economic decline in various
areas of the labor market due to the passage of S.B. 1070 and other anti-immigrant legislation).
110. See Danny Postel & Ted Smukler, ‘Go Ahead, Try and Make Me Pay You’: Wage Theft
and S.B. 1070, IN THESE TIMES (July 27, 2010), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/6265/go_
ahead_try_and_make_me_pay_you_wage_theft_and_s.b._1070/ [https://perma.cc/VG2Y-DCVH]
(quoting an Arizona community organizer who witnessed an increase in the number of workers
who experienced wage-theft in the months leading up to the enactment of S.B. 1070); see also
Dianne Enriquez, S.B. 1070 Will Not Be Tolerated, INTERFAITH WORKER JUST. (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.iwj.org/worker-center-network/no-sb1070 [https://perma.cc/99KF-3D75] (reporting
an increase in wage-theft cases filed with the Arizona branch of Interfaith Alliance for Worker
Justice, an organization that rallied for worker justice).
111. See Lee, supra note 5, at 664–65 (explaining that enforcing criminalization of wagetheft is a solution, but calling police officers to arrest employers ultimately exacerbates the situation
where the worker is an immigrant; this is especially true with anti-immigrant laws like S.B. 1070,
which create distrust in the immigrant community due to a belief that police officers have no
discretion to enforce labor laws over immigration laws).
112. See Postel & Smukler, supra note 110 (quoting a group coordinator who witnessed a
decrease in the number of immigrants willing to protest because they felt a general mistrust of
police officers even though their state was not passing anti-immigration laws).
113. See BBVA RES., supra note 28, at 21–22 (estimating in the few months following S.B.
1070’s enactment, there were fewer Hispanics in Arizona, either because of fear of the new law’s
application or because of Arizona’s economic crisis).
114. See id. (referencing the population survey findings).
115. Legal Arizona Workers Act, H.B. 2779, 48th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007)
(prohibiting Arizona businesses from hiring undocumented immigrants by requiring employers to
use E-Verify, a system offered by DHS used to verify immigration status of new hires).
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in 2012, the number of undocumented immigrants in Arizona dropped by
40%.116 Although the recession in 2008 may have contributed to the
drop in numbers, in no other state did the number of immigrants drop so
drastically.117 Neighboring states like California and New Mexico only
experienced an approximate 5% decrease in the number of undocumented
immigrants during the same time period.118
Two industries suffered greatly from Arizona’s anti-immigrant
legislation: the agriculture and construction industry.119 The decline in
agriculture employment occurred as early as 2007, prior to the passing of
LAWA, because farmers anticipated fewer laborers would be available
to harvest crops after the E-verify provision took effect in January of
2008.120 Meanwhile, between 2008 and 2011, the percentage of
Arizona’s population employed in the construction industry was cut in
half.121
Supporters of S.B. 1070 defended the anti-immigrant legislation
because they argued it was meant to free-up employment opportunities
for native and documented workers.122 However, since 2008, less than
116. See Lauren Godles, Arizona as a Test Case for Immigration Effects on Employment,
ON LAB. (Apr. 29, 2016) https://onlabor.org/arizona-as-a-test-case-for-immigration-effects-onemployment/ [https://perma.cc/2B5T-53ZK] (estimating the second largest drop in the number of
immigrants during that period in New York at 25%); see also Bob Davis, The Thorny Economics
of Illegal Immigration: Arizona’s Economy Took a Hit When Many Illegal Immigrants Left, but
Benefits Also Materialized, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-thornyeconomics-of-illegal-immigration-1454984443 (describing the 40% drop in undocumented
immigrants as the “biggest percentage decline [in] any state . . . ”).
117. Godles, supra note 116 (comparing Arizona’s 40% population drop to New York’s
drop of about 25%, Illinois’s drop of roughly 14%, and California’s drop of about 13%).
118. Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws, supra note 109,
at 13.
119. Id. at 4–5 (identifying both construction and agriculture as among industries most
heavily populated with undocumented immigrants nationwide, particularly in Arizona).
120. Id. at 5–6 (estimating the number of Arizona agriculture workers dropped
approximately 16% from 2007 to 2011; while in neighboring states like California and New
Mexico, the number of agriculture workers increased slightly).
121. Id. at 4–5 (recognizing declines in housing prices influenced the change in construction
employment as it did in most states, but still emphasizing LAWA’s ultimate responsibility for the
drastic decline in employment by making it more expensive to hire employees and requiring
electronic verification of employee information).
122. See id. at 4 (“After E-Verify went into effect, the foreign-born population bore the
brunt of the employment decline in the construction industry, but native employment in
construction did not increase to fill the gap, contrary to the claims of E-Verify supporters.”).
Nowrasteh argues that supporters of LAWA were wrong to believe the E-Verify provision would
result in an increase in the number of documented immigrants or citizens taking over jobs
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10% of the jobs previously held by undocumented immigrants were taken
over by authorized workers.123 Despite the labor shortage and mass
exodus of thousands of immigrants, Arizona’s unemployment rate
continues to be one of the highest in the nation.124 Although the law was
successful in driving out thousands of immigrants, it did not cure or even
mitigate the problem of unemployment.125
The second major effect S.B. 1070 had in Arizona was a loss of entire
industries, such as the immigrant-dependent construction industry
discussed above.126 A question was therefore raised: if undocumented
workers left the state, why did employers follow? One theory is that
immigrants took the jobs with them because they and their families
created and sustained certain industries.127 Under this theory,
undocumented workers contribute to the economic growth as
entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers.128 Stated differently, they
increase the demand for goods and services. By leaving the state of
Arizona, undocumented immigrants took with them their money and
spending power, which lowered the demand in all industries.129
immigrants left behind. Rather, both the number of undocumented immigrants and the number of
documented immigrants or citizens employed in construction in Arizona from 2006 to 2010
decreased. Id. See also Godles, supra note 116 (noting supporters also hoped anti-immigration
laws would raise wages for native workers).
123. See Davis, supra note 116 (“[L]ow-skilled U.S. natives and legal Hispanic immigrants
since 2008 picked up less than 10% of the jobs once held by undocumented immigrants.”).
124. See Godles, supra note 116 (describing the results of Arizona’s exodus failed in
lowering unemployment rates).
125. See Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws, supra note
109, at 8 (arguing Arizona’s anti-immigration laws actually increased the price of labor and left
Arizona in a poor financial state).
126. See id. at 4 (“Arizona’s employment of construction workers declined 14 percentage
points more than in the neighboring states of California and New Mexico between LAWA’s
passage in July 2007 and September 2011.”).
127. See Michael D. Nicholson, The Facts on Immigration Today: 2017 Edition,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
reports/2017/04/20/430736/facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/
[https://perma.cc/LCE3YLLA] (discussing the positive contributions immigrants create in the U.S. economy and the
financial consequences of mass deportations); see also Nowrasteh, The Aftermath of Arizona’s
Immigration Laws, supra note 109 (blaming LAWA and S.B. 1070 for pressuring immigrants to
leave Arizona, taking with them jobs in industries that were not affected by the Great Recession,
such as agriculture).
128. Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws, supra note 109,
at 12.
129. Id.
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It is undisputed that Arizona’s economy suffered terribly in the months
leading up to and following the enactment of S.B. 1070.130 Despite the
passage of time, Arizona’s economy is still suffering after the enactment
of anti-immigration legislation culminating with S.B. 1070.131 In 2016,
the construction industry had only half the number of jobs it did ten years
prior.132 Many employers were forced to move their companies out of
Arizona; these moves were either premised on a labor shortage in
positions traditionally filled by undocumented workers, or because
patrons were wholly formed from immigrants and their families.
D. Texas’s Senate Bill 4: How Members of the Community Fought
Against the Texas Legislature
During his Facebook live video stream, Governor Abbott explained the
purpose of S.B. 4 was to ban sanctuary cities which, he claimed, harbored
criminals who were in the country unlawfully.133 He argued S.B. 4 is
meant to ensure safety for all.134 He also warned public officials that the
law imposed penalties of up to $25,000 per day, jail time, and removal
from office for non-compliance.135 Like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, Texas’s
S.B. 4 broadens local law enforcement’s authority to enforce federal
immigration laws.136
Community-organizing groups throughout Texas and from various
parts of the country, including Arizona, came to protest and rally in what
became known as the “Summer of Resistance.”137 Some of the dozens
130. Id. at 12–15 (arguing the decline in the immigrant population further lowered real
estate prices and increased rental vacancy during the Great Recession).
131. See Godles, supra note 116 (discussing the effects of the “massive immigrant exodus”
on labor and wages in Arizona).
132. Id.
133. Office of the Governor Greg Abbott, Governor Greg Abbot Signs Bill Banning
Sanctuary Cities Into Law, FACEBOOK (May 7, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.facebook.com/
TexasGovernor/videos/10155316084703256/ [https://perma.cc/92NP-EXRC].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 756 (W.D. Tex. 2017), granting stay
in part, 2017 WL 4250186 (5th Cir. 2017).
137. Mary Huber, Hundreds Protest S.B. 4 on Final Day of 85th Legislature,
MYSTATESMAN (May 29, 2017), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/hundreds-protest-final-day-85th-legislature/FElZNQ9uSaan4a6geYZD5O/ [https://perma.
cc/UX5A-NA9D]. See, e.g., James Barragan, Texas Officials Call for a “Summer of Resistance”
Against Sanctuary Cities Ban, DALL. NEWS (May 16, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/immigration/2017/05/16/local-officials-call-summer-resistanceagainst-sanctuary-cities-ban
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of groups that participated in the organization of various protests included
the Workers Defense Project,138 Voto Latino,139 United We Dream,140
and Texas Organizing Project.141 The protestors made their disapproval
of the new Bill known when close to one thousand protesters united at
the Texas State Capitol on the last day of the 85th legislative session.142
Protesters created a sea of red t-shirts inside of the Capitol Rotunda and
conveyed a simple message: “Fight back; No S.B. 4.”143
Even local law enforcement from major cities withheld support from
the anti-immigration law.144 Dallas’s law enforcement officials asked
their city mayor, Mike Rawlings, to file suit.145 Two law enforcement
officials from the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department argued the law
[https://perma.cc/PE4C-AETC] (explaining the “Summer of Resistance” as a rally cry for
opposition against the ban on Sanctuary Cities in the form of marches, litigation, and a push to
vote).
138. See About Us, WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, http://www.workersdefense.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/5F64-FGQ3] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter WORKERS DEF. PROJECT,
About Us] (“Workers Defense Project (WDP) is a membership-based organization that empowers
low-income workers to achieve fair employment through education, direct services, organizing and
strategic partnerships.”).
139. About Us, VOTO LATINO, http://votolatino.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/93YFLJEQ] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (“Voto Latino is a pioneering civic media organization that seeks
to transform America by recognizing Latinos’ innate leadership.”).
140. United We Dream (UWD) is a campaign in support of the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act). See About UWD, UNITED WE DREAM,
https://unitedwedream.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/W99X-EF9H] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018)
(stating UWD is one of the largest immigrant youth-led organizations).
141. See About TOP, TEX. ORGANIZING PROJECT, http://organizetexas.org/contactus/about-top/ [https://perma.cc/C43T-DTLL] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (“The Texas Organizing
Project (TOP) works to improve the lives of low-income and working class Texas families through
community organizing, and civic and electoral engagement.”).
142. Huber, supra note 137.
143. Id.; see Ryan Autullo, Pastor Arrested in SB 4 Protest Says He Couldn’t Stand on the
Sidelines, MYSTATESMAN (June 26, 2017, 5:49 PM), https://www.mystatesman.com/
news/local/pastor-arrested-protest-says-couldn-stand-the-sidelines/uNZVUrCYSUcEzUy4scqJ1J/
[https://perma.cc/VDK6-4SBG] (detailing the arrest of Reverend Jim Rigby as he participated in
the protest against S.B. 4); see also Texas Lawmakers Accuse Each Other of Assault, Threats as
Hundreds of ‘SB4’ Protesters Disrupt Session, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (May 29, 2017)
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/texas-lawmakers-accuse-each-other-assault-threatshundreds-sb4-protesters-n765856 [https://perma.cc/CK57-5RKQ] (stating protesters wore shirts
with the slogan “Lucha” [“fight” in Spanish], chanted “Here to stay!”, and waved banners that read
“See you in court!”).
144. See Limón & Wilonsky, supra note 8 (summarizing Dallas County Sheriff’s argument
that S.B. 4 would create fear in the community, leaving more crimes unreported).
145. Id.
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would lead to fewer reported crimes from the immigrant community for
fear of deportation.146 Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo argued the
anti-immigrant legislation would only make protecting the community
more difficult as less immigrants would report crimes or be willing to
participate in ongoing investigations.147 Instead of making their city
safer, law enforcement officials argued legislation like S.B. 4 would
make their city more dangerous.148
In City of El Cenizo v. Texas,149 major cities including Houston, San
Antonio, Dallas, Austin, and El Paso, along with Maverick County and
the League of United Latino American Citizens (LULAC) filed suit in
opposition of S.B. 4.150 The City of El Cenizo, Maverick County, and
LULAC were the first to file suit—just one day after the signing of S.B.
4.151 The plaintiffs’ oral arguments against S.B. 4 began on June 26,
2017 in San Antonio.152 Two months later, the court partially granted
the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to stop portions of S.B.
4 from taking effect on September 1, 2017.153 Among the provisions the
injunction blocked were: 1) the mandate on local officials to assist in
146. Id. (quoting Dallas Executive Chief Deputy, Jesse Flores, who spoke against S.B. 4
alongside Dallas Chief Deputy, Jesse Herrera).
147. See Meagan Flynn, Houston’s Chief Acevedo, Defiant and Introspective, Rails Against
SB 4, HOUSTON PRESS (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/hpd-chief-acevedolambasted-sb4-in-defiant-candid-monologue-9394376 [https://perma.cc/HHQ4-EC6Y] (quoting
Chief Acevedo, “[T]he number of Hispanics reporting rapes has dropped 43 percent compared to
the same time last year, with a 13 percent drop in other violent crimes. That’s compared to an 8.2
percent increase in non-Hispanic victims reporting other violent crime.”).
148. See Id. (quoting Houston Police Chief, Art Acevedo, “When undocumented
immigrants are afraid to report a crime for fear of police handing them over to ICE . . . that means
a criminal goes free to prey on more people.”). See generally Limón & Wilonsky, supra note 8
(quoting Dallas Executive Chief Deputy, Jesse Flores, “If members of the community are afraid to
come forward and report crimes due to fear of deportation, then those crimes will not be reported
or investigated . . . . We believe our community is safer when they report crimes without fear of
deportation.”).
149. 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 755 (W.D. Tex. 2017), granting stay in part, 2017 WL 4250186
(5th Cir. 2017).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 756.
152. Julián Aguilar, Attorneys Spar Over Texas Immigration Law in Federal Court, TEX.
TRIB. (June 26, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/06/26/attorneys-spar-over-texasimmigration-law/ [https://perma.cc/UC2H-XP25].
153. City of El Cenizo, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 812–13 (stating the District Court, “enjoin[ed]
those portions of S.B. 4 that [it] preliminarily determined are preempted or are constitutionally
invalid on their face.”).
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federal immigration enforcement under penalty of a fine; 2) the
prohibition on local officials from speaking out publicly against antiimmigration laws like S.B. 4; and 3) the requirement on sheriffs and
police departments to accept requests to continue detention from federal
immigrations agents.154
However, just like in Arizona, the injunction did not block the most
controversial provision: the right of a local official to ask about
immigration status.155 The court justified its decision not to enjoin this
provision on the basis that, although police officers had the right to ask
for immigration status, status could not be the basis for arrest.156 Using
similar language found in the opinion of Arizona v. United States, the
court clarified the arrest would have to be lawful for law enforcement
officials to inquire into a detainee’s status.157 The court went on to
declare that even if officers did obtain the detainee’s legal status, the
officer would not be forced to share this information with immigration
agents, as S.B. 4 originally schemed.158
Subsequently, the defendants moved for a stay of the injunction.159 In
late September, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed two of
First,
the five provisions enjoined by the District Court.160
§ 752.053(b)(3), which prohibited law enforcement from interfering with
those choosing to cooperate with ICE.161 Second, § 752.053(a)(1),
which restrained law enforcement from adopting, enforcing, or endorsing
a policy that would prohibit or limit the enforcement of immigration

154. Id.
155. Id. (concluding that although it would serve the public’s interest to prohibit the
legislature from passing legislation that allows local police officers to enforce immigration laws,
the court is limited from doing so because it does not violate the Constitution); see also Julián
Aguilar, Judge Temporarily Blocks Immigration Enforcement Law, TEX. TRIB.,
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/30/judge-temporarily-blocks-sanctuary-cities-law/ [https://
perma.cc/TH63-KE4D] (last updated Aug. 30, 2017, 9:00 PM) (summarizing Judge Garcia’s
holding).
156. City of El Cenizo, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65 (“If for example, during a lawful stop an
officer obtains information that the detained individual is undocumented, the officer may not arrest
the individual or prolong the detention on this basis”).
157. Id. at 762–63.
158. Id. at 764–65.
159. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, No. 17-50762, 2017 WL 4250186, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 25,
2017).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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laws.162 Although the courts enjoined large portions of the “Show Me
Your Papers” law, S.B. 4 took effect on September 1, 2017.163
Most recently, the Firth Circuit withdrew their September 2017
opinion.164 The Fifth Circuit only stayed the injunction for
§ 752.053(a)(1), only as it prohibits elected officials, not public
employees, from endorsing policies that prohibit or materially limit the
enforcement of immigration laws.165 The rest of S.B. 4 was upheld in
its entirety.166
In the aftermath of the District Court’s decision in 2017, advocacy
groups began educating members in the community on how best to
interact with law enforcement.167 The first piece of advice is detainees
have a right to remain silent with respect to their immigration status.168
In the event detainees are pulled over in their vehicles, organizers, such
as the ACLU, urge they do not provide false documentation or foreign
identification.169 Once under arrest, the detainee should only provide
their name, residence address, and date of birth.170 Finally, detainees
should make clear they wish to remain silent, not sign anything, and not
make any decision without a lawyer’s counsel.171

162. Id. at *2.
163. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 756 (W.D. Tex. 2017), granting stay
in part, 2017 WL 4250186 (5th Cir. 2017).
164. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. May 8, 2018).
165. Id. at 184–85 (holding the provision unconstitutional if applied to elected officials
because it violates the First Amendment by infringing on the elected officials’ political speech).
166. See generally id.
167. See generally Know Your Rights Under SB4, ACLU OF TEX.,
https://www.aclutx.org/en/sb4 [https://perma.cc/C6BR-TGZS] (last visited Mar. 27, 2018)
(explaining S.B. 4, the law’s influence on law enforcement procedures, and what to do “[i]f
questioned about immigration status by local or state police”); Kavita Khandekar Chopra, What
You Need to Know About SB4, HUM. RTS. INITIATIVE OF N. TEX. (Aug. 31, 2017),
http://www.hrionline.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-sb4/
[https://perma.cc/45MP-URYW]
(emphasizing individuals in the United States without legal status still have rights, and listing their
rights in light of S.B. 4); SB 4 Community Advisory, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR.,
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sb4communityadvisory_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NVM6-B96M] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (detailing how those without legal
status can protect themselves in the wake of S.B. 4, including the power of knowing individual
rights and creating contingency plans if detained).
168. ACLU OF TEX., supra note 167.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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III. YOU CANNOT HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN WAGE-THEFT
AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION LAWS
A. Current Workplace Conditions in Low-Wage Occupations
At first glance, workplace regulation and immigration monitoring
would seem independent of one another.172 However, the fact that lowincome industries typically experience the most workplace violations,173
and most low-wage positions are occupied by undocumented
immigrants,174 means a sector of the population is at high risk of
exploitation: those employees in low-income industries. Thus, to address
either issue, the government must simultaneously reform immigration
and labor laws.175 Reforming labor laws alone will not be enough to
protect undocumented workers as there are already, albeit ineffective,
federal and state policies in place meant to protect undocumented
immigrants from wage-theft, yet large numbers of employees continue to
suffer—fearing employer retaliation for asserting their right to a fair
wage.176 Indeed, even current policies prohibiting employer retaliation
172. See Lee, supra note 5, at 657 (suggesting those who support criminalization of wagetheft fail to recognize the disconnect between labor and immigrations laws).
173. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432 (citing studies from across the country
concluding that low-wage industries are also high-violation industries; violations that include
failure to pay minimum wage and overtime, failure to provide safety equipment, and exposure to
hazardous workplace dangers).
174. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET:
AN UPDATE 15 (July 2010), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-20092010/reports/07-23-immigrants_in_labor_force.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSR9-4RRV] (estimating in
2009 that 53% of all U.S. workers employed in construction, restaurants, retail, landscaping,
agriculture, food manufacturing, and building services were born in Mexico or Central America);
see also BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS–
2016
at
3
(May
18,
2017),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQ2Y-GHML] (estimating foreign-born workers are more likely to work in
service occupations, such as food preparation and serving, construction, maintenance, and
production).
175. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 439–446 (analyzing case studies of Washington
and California and arguing that the co-enforcement of labor standards by the state and
complementary lateral mechanisms should be considered within immigration reform to expand the
number of workers protected).
176. See id. at 433–34 (asserting that the gap “[b]etween laws and regulations on the books
intended to insure against exploitation and the implementation and enforcement of these laws”
discourages immigrants from exercising their labor rights in the face of employer violations such
as retaliation or intimidation of workers).
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have been unsuccessful specifically because anti-immigration laws
inadvertently allow employers to avoid labor laws and take advantage of
undocumented employees. Because the two issues are intertwined, these
workers need protection outside of labor laws in the form of an enduring
legal status.
Modern immigration is driven, in part, by the pursuit of better
employment.177 In the United States, the majority of undocumented
immigrants come through the U.S.-Mexico border from Mexico and
Central America.178 Crossing the border means leaving behind their
families and risking their lives, but undocumented immigrants continue
to come to the United States because United States employers are
hiring.179 Although many immigrants envision a country of opportunity
that defends rights and freedom, many individuals are soon faced with a
harsh reality: undocumented immigrants’ rights are routinely violated in
the United States.180 Nevertheless, immigrants continue to stay and
more continue to come because it is richer to be poor in the United States
than it is to be poor in their country of origin.181
Since undocumented workers are motivated by economic reasons to
cross the border,182 employers can use this as leverage. By the time an
undocumented immigrant has reached the United States, they have
invested time and money.183 They are willing to take employment in
177. See Laque, supra note 28 (asserting trends in modern human migration indicate most
migration “[s]erves the purpose of uniting families, escaping persecution, or more importantly,
finding better employment opportunities”).
178. Id.
179. See BBVA RES., supra note 28, at 10–11 (concluding Mexican migration to the United
States stems from the U.S. economy’s demand for cheap labor, rather than a lack of opportunities
in Mexico); see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., supra note 27 (reporting immigrants actually
contribute to the creation of jobs in the U.S. by virtue of their roles as entrepreneurs, consumers
and taxpayers).
180. Laque, supra note 28.
181. See BBVA RES., supra note 28, at 10–12 (identifying three factors that most influence
migration from Mexico to the United States: 1) demands in the U.S. labor market, 2) lack of
employment in Mexico, and 3) the wage discrepancy between Mexico and the United States).
182. See Douglas S. Massey & Kristin E. Espinosa, What’s Driving Mexico-U.S.
Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 939, 990 (Jan.
1997) (“Growing economic insecurity coupled with a strong desire to participate in [the] new
political economy have led Mexican households to search for ways to self-insure against threats to
family income and to gain access to scarce capital.”).
183. See id. at 962 (noting price inflation in the U.S. dollar and devaluation in the Mexican
peso are likely to deter immigration because these factors increase the cost of immigrating illegally,
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almost any industry for almost any pay.184 The employer knows this.
The employer takes advantage of the immigrant’s vulnerable position by
offering low wages; lower than the rate corresponding to the position.185
Lower, even, than what an employer might have offered other employees
who are working in the United States lawfully.186
The employers’ lack of incentive to offer undocumented workers a
“good” paying job does not end at poor wages. For example, in the
construction industry, workers are never formally trained, rarely provided
with any safety equipment, and hardly ever offered employment
benefits.187 Many receive improvised training—new hires are trained by
observing and copying a veteran worker’s technique, sometimes in an
unfamiliar industry, handling foreign tools.188 Employment benefits,
like health insurance and paid vacation or sick days are almost nonexistent,189 despite the fact that low-income industries are the most
dangerous to work in.190
Financial gain motivates immigrants to take substandard jobs as well
as employers to create substandard workplaces.191 Failing to provide
indicating that undocumented immigrants use a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether or not
to migrate).
184. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 18 (reporting the majority of construction workers
in Texas suffer from economic hardship and are faced with potential exposure to hazards that result
in worksite injuries and fatalities).
185. See id. 23 (illustrating wage-theft through the personal experience of a construction
worker and highlighting the issues associated with prevailing wage mandates that require
employers to pay higher wages when working on publicly funded worksites).
186. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 11 (estimating that on
average, undocumented construction workers earn lower wages than the average of all other
construction workers).
187. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 19 (noting employees with low-wages are more likely
to lack workplace benefits, labor in risky and unsafe conditions, and be misclassified as a
contractor; yet these same workers are less likely to be protected by workers’ compensation).
188. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 16 (describing how onthe-job “training” is one method used by construction workers to compensate for the lack of formal
training). On-the-job training is sometimes combined with cross-training, mentoring systems, and
frequent job rotations. Id.
189. See id. at 31 (estimating less than half of Dallas construction workers were offered
health insurance by their employer, only 30% of workers have paid personal days, a mere 20%
receive paid sick days, and just 18% were offered some form of retirement or pension benefit).
190. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 14 (estimating Texas construction workers are four
and a half times more likely to be killed at work than the average non-Texas construction worker).
191. See Wade Goodwyn, Texas Contractors Say Playing by the Rules Doesn’t Pay, NPR
TEX. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 11, 2013, 3:21 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/04/11/176777498/texas-
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living wages, safety equipment, training, or employment benefits further
reduces costs on the already money-saving practice of hiring cheap labor
from the immigrant community.192 These four employer practices
comprise only some of the main problems plaguing low-wage
industries.193 Although undocumented immigrants are most affected by
poor working conditions because they have less access to public
resources and face the threat of deportation, other employees lawfully
working in the United States are also impacted by the lack of living
wages, benefits, and training.194 Thus, the entire community should care
about the unjust labor practices employers use to reduce costs in lowwage industries because the social cost of poor labor practices is placed
on Texas taxpayers.195
In addition to wage-theft, undocumented workers are also more likely
to suffer from employee misclassification.196 Misclassification is
occasionally included in the definition of wage-theft197 and takes place
when an employer classifies an employee as an independent
contractor.198 This practice strips from workers basic employee rights
contractors-say-playing-by-the-rules-doesnt-pay (claiming the main benefit contractors derive
from purposefully misclassifying workers is a reduced cost for employees, such as paying social
security and taxes to stay competitive with other businesses in the industry).
192. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 24–25 (discussing different methods employers use
to reduce costs, including payroll fraud); see also Goodwyn, supra note 191 (quoting the owner of
a landscaping construction company who claimed that he purposefully misclassified his workers as
independent contractors to avoid having to pay an hourly rate, thereby also avoiding overtime pay
for lengthy projects).
193. See Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 432–34 (addressing labor conditions in low-wage
occupations across the country); see also PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 13 (addressing 2013
working conditions in Texas’s construction industry); THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH,
supra note 2, at 2–4.
194. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 45–50.
195. See id. at 47 (discussing the social costs of injured workers who work for employers
that chose to not provide workers compensation or do not provide an option for health insurance).
196. See Lisa D. Kinzer, Employee Misclassification in Texas: Why the New Law Won’t
Work, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 435, 447 (2014) (identifying the employer’s ability to avoid penalties if
they hire an undocumented worker and then misclassify him as an independent contractor).
197. Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/ [https://perma.cc/JS8B-B647] (last visited
Mar. 27, 2018) (discussing the critical benefits and protections guaranteed by law that employees
are denied by being misclassified).
198. See Kinzer, supra note 196, at 436 (discussing the differing definitions state and federal
agencies, such as the TWC and IRS, use to define an “employee” and “independent contractor,”
and concluding that the various definitions create an obstacle for enforcing civil penalties for
misclassification); THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 2–4, 14 (defining
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such as the right to a federal minimum wage and overtime pay.199 In
2013, more than 300,000 construction workers in Texas were
misclassified as independent contractors.200 Today, in Houston alone,
about 38% of construction workers are misclassified.201 If these workers
filed a wage-theft complaint with the DOL or TWC, they would bear the
heavy burden of proving they qualify as employees and are not
subcontractors or contractors.202 Overcoming this burden is difficult
when the employee has never received formal training, receives minimal
supervision, and has signed tax forms indicating a subcontractor position
rather than a regular employee.203
Some employers misclassify to keep their employees off their records
for tax purposes and pay them in cash or under the table.204 Employers
go as far as requiring their employees to sign subcontractor tax forms.205
Misclassification is appealing to employers because it allows them to
escape paying employment taxes in addition to regular employee benefits
employers are generally responsible for securing, like contributing to the
Texas Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund.206
Admittedly, misclassification is appealing to some workers in lowincome occupations—they put more of their already low gross income in
“misclassification” as an employer labeling a wage worker as an independent contractor for tax
purposes, thereby rendering employees ineligible for worker’s compensation payments). See
generally Goodwyn, supra note 191 (discussing how “independent contractors” are utilized in
specialized areas during the subcontracting process of construction work).
199. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 14 (“Misclassified
workers often lose the basic protections of employees, such as the right to minimum wage and time
and half for overtime hours, and they must pay their employer’s share of payroll taxes”).
200. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 24.
201. THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 33.
202. E.g. TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N, Employment Status–A Comparative Approach,
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/files/businesses/form-c-8-employment-status-comparative-approachtwc.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW3U-KLJN] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (distinguishing an employee
from a contractor by comparing the relationship each has to the workplace, including factors like
who receives instruction on how the job will be performed, who provides tools and equipment to
perform the job, and whether the person has any investment or potential for loss in the business).
203. See generally id. (discussing the complications being classified as an independent
contractor can create for an employee without proper resources).
204. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 24 (explaining how payroll fraud and
misclassification deprive employees of their legal rights).
205. See THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 14 (reporting certain
employers ask employees to sign an IRS 1099 form instead of the W-2 form that is legally required
for employees).
206. See id.
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their pockets without having taxes and other employee deductions taken
out of their paycheck.207 However, when an employee reports a claim
of wage-theft, a common defense for not paying minimum wage or
overtime is that the worker was hired as a contractor or subcontractor—
not an employee.208 Thus, misclassification has many negative
consequences that employers do not disclose to their employees;
consequences employees do not learn about until it is generally too
late.209 Although misclassification is not typically considered a form of
wage-theft, it can lead to devastating consequences for a low-wage
worker if the employer decides not to pay his employee.210
B. How S.B. 4 Negatively Impacted Workplace Conditions for
All Workers
The large number of undocumented workers experiencing wage-theft
in low-income industries is compounded by the government’s failure to
enact immigration laws that protect them.211 This failure creates an
environment in which employers can easily take advantage of an already
vulnerable sector of the population.212 Inefficient labor laws and anti-

207. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 24. According to Juan Girón, a drywaller in
Houston, Texas, even workers like him who have the proper documentation to work in the United
States lawfully stay in these jobs because “you’re receiving money week after week. What happens
if you lose your job, and then two, three, four weeks pass without getting another job that’s why I
decided to stay quiet about it in the end.” Id.
208. Goodwyn, supra note 191 (illustrating how classifying a worker as a sub-contractor
insulates the employer from paying taxes, Social Security, unemployment, and overtime
compensation).
209. See THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 33–34 (relating the
story of a residential construction worker who only learned of his misclassification as an
independent contractor after he was injured on the job; his employer was thus able to escape liability
for the injury).
210. See id. at 34 (explaining the worker’s struggle even after seeking legal aid).
211. See id. at 25–39 (explaining how the issue and its effects are nationwide). The negative
impacts of misclassification of workers in the construction industry can be found in most major
cities across the country like Atlanta, Georgia, Dallas, Texas, and Nashville, Tennessee. Id.
212. See Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino
Migrants: Wage Theft and Robbery, 52 SOC. Q. 593, 594 (2011) (explaining the result of labor
demand and restrictive immigration policies is an exploitative relationship between immigrants and
those who seek to exploit them); see also Molina et al., supra note 76 (elaborating on Fussell’s
explanation a step further by concluding this exploitative relationship usually manifests in the
employer threatening the employee with calling immigration officials).
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immigration laws only make the workplace worse—for all workers.213
Native and naturalized workers, although not fearful of deportation, are
generally caught in the cross fire: employers commit wage-theft against
lawful workers because the agencies charged with handling wage-theft
claims are inefficient, diminishing the likelihood of recovery of wages
for any employee filing a claim.214 In other words, the low risk of being
penalized for committing unfair employment practices is outweighed by
the free labor obtained. Agencies tasked with investigating and punishing
wage-theft claims lack the resources necessary to carry out their
mandate.215 This inefficiency allows employers to steal wages with
impunity.216 As a result, the consequence of anti-immigration laws, such
as S.B. 4, that create distrust between immigrant communities and law
enforcement, gives employers yet another incentive to create and
maintain a draconian workplace.217
The advantage an employer has over his unauthorized workers has
directly increased with anti-immigration laws like S.B. 4 which makes it
easier for employer violations of labor laws to occur and go unnoticed.218
Employers that set out to commit wage-theft depend on their employee’s
fear of deportation and mistrust of the police and government.219

213. See THEODORE ET AL., BUILD A BETTER SOUTH, supra note 2, at 13 (“Several workers
reported that employers retaliated against those who pursued wage claims by firing or reassigning
them or by calling immigration authorities.”).
214. See Verga, supra note 24, at 286–88 (arguing that criminalization of wage-theft is
necessary because the federal and state agencies responsible for handling wage claims are
inefficient, which reduces the likelihood that workers will actually recover wages); Lee, supra note
5, at 661–62 (2014) (“[D]ay laborers often face grim choices when pursuing the recovery of wages.
Their relatively low wages often deter private attorneys from taking on those cases . . . [a]nd while
day laborers may proceed on their own through administrative or civil channels in some states, such
a choice can be daunting.”).
215. Verga, supra note 24, at 286–89 (enumerating the inefficiencies within the DOL to
meaningfully respond to complaints to the Wage and Hour Division because of issues like the lack
of resources or the inexistent political will to investigate the claims of low-income workers).
216. See id. at 287 (“In addition to the federal FLSA, almost every state deals with nonpayment of wages in its state labor laws. Like their federal counterparts, the state agencies charged
with enforcing labor laws are understaffed, have very limited investigative resources, and generally
lack the political will to assist low-wage workers.”).
217. Lee, supra note 5 at 664–65.
218. See, e.g., Verga, supra note 24, at 293 (suggesting police department handling wagetheft complaints implement a formal policy to refrain from enforcing immigration law so as to not
silence victims and impede officers in enforcement of criminal penalties).
219. See Lee, supra note 5, at 664
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Employers use this fear to intimidate their unauthorized employees from
trying to collect stolen, unpaid wages.220
It is well known among the immigrant community that police officers
can ask questions regarding an individual’s immigration status.221
However, police departments in major cities throughout Texas have
refrained from doing so.222 Officers avoid inquiring into a person’s legal
status, particularly when the person is a complaining victim, in an attempt
to strengthen the community’s cooperation and trust in the police
department.223
However, law enforcement’s efforts to gain trust with the immigrant
community was directly affected by the signing of S.B. 4.224 In the
Where, for example, a subcontractor refuses to pay a day laborer for a day spent laying asphalt,
wage theft laws empower that worker to call the police, thereby injecting a bit of urgency,
discomfort, and fear into the process of recovering lost wages . . . [if the employee is unauthorized
to work though] the wage theft fix becomes much more complicated, and in fact, the fix may end
up making a bad situation worse.

220. See PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 17–18 (quoting Adrian Magallanes, a Dallas
ironworker: “If you tell [the foreman] something is unsafe, they tell you to still do it. If you don’t
do it, you’re fired.”).
221. See NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & POL’Y, INSECURE COMMUNITIES:
LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (May 2013),
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.
PDF [https://perma.cc/QH7W-KKGK] (demonstrating a decrease in crime reports through a
telephone survey of 2,004 Latinos living in Cook County (Chicago), Harris County (Houston), Los
Angeles County, and Maricopa County (Phoenix)). A substantial number of these residents were
less likely to voluntarily contact police out of fear of questions regarding immigration status. Id.
222. E.g., Dianne Solis, North Texas Police Officers Try to Ease Fear Among Immigrants
Over Senate Bill 4, DALL. NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
immigration/2017/08/17/north-texas-police-officers-try-ease-fear-among-immigrants-senate-bill4 [https://perma.cc/C374-896D] (reporting from an event taking place in Grand Prairie, Texas with
several police departments discussing how these departments would interpret S.B. 4, and quoting
a former Dallas police officer who claimed the Dallas Police Department did not routinely ask
people for their immigration status).
223. The Grand Prairie, Texas Police Department has a support system for Spanishspeaking residents called UNIDOS. UNIDOS, GRAND PRAIRIE TEX., http://www.gptx.org/citygovernment/city-departments/police-department/unidos#ad-image-2
[https://perma.cc/6WJBQZUR] (last updated Jan. 6, 2016). UNIDOS is a Hispanic community outreach program that
originated in 2002 by the efforts of a Grand Prairie Police Officer with a goal to provide assistance
to Spanish-speaking residents of Grand Prairie. Id. However, even with this program in place, Sgt.
Munoz of the Grand Prairie Police Department expressed concern after the passage of S.B. 4 that
the community would begin to fear calling the police, causing a breakdown of confidence in the
uniform. Solis, supra note 222.
224. Brooke A. Lewis, HPD Chief Announces Decrease in Hispanics Reporting Rape and
Violent Crimes Compared to Last Year, HOUS. CHRON, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
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months leading up to the enactment of S.B. 4, police departments across
Texas noticed a drop in the number of immigrants reporting crimes.225
The Houston Police Department reported a significant drop in the number
of Hispanics reporting rape and other violent crimes as compared to the
year prior.226 Specifically, there was a 43% drop in the number of rape
cases reported by Hispanics victims despite a 12% increase in the number
of rape cases reported by non-Hispanic victims.227
Carrolton’s Police Department reported a similar finding with respect
to neighborhood crime calls.228 In February of 2017, District 11 (the
predominantly Hispanic southern part of Carrolton) did not receive a
single vehicle burglary, home burglary, or car theft report.229 This is
significant as exactly one year prior, four car burglaries, two home
burglaries, and two stolen vehicles were reported.230 Carrolton’s Police
Department speculates the lack of reports might be due to a fear of
deportation.231
As a result of today’s anti-immigrant environment, wage-theft is
among the list of crimes left under or unreported.232 Fewer victims of
wage-theft are coming forward.233 One indicator wage-theft is on the
rise is the increased number of organizations mobilizing to counteract
wage-theft.234 In the past six years, Workers Defense Project (WDP)
has tripled in size, expanding their efforts to provide legal aid to lowtexas/houston/article/HPD-chief-announces-decrease-in-Hispanics-11053829.php [https://perma.
cc/6FDD-SBZ6] (last updated Apr. 6, 2017, 10:01 AM).
225. Solis, supra note 222 (quoting Grand Prairie police chief, David Dye, “It has already
hurt our trust, . . . we already have a lot of fear out there because of Senate Bill 4. It has already
created damage.”).
226. Lewis, supra note 224.
227. Id.
228. Elvia Limón, Carrollton Police Cite Deportation Fears as Possible Reason for Decline
in Neighborhood Crimes Calls, DALL. NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/carrollton/2017/04/21/carrollton-police-cite-deporation-fears-possible-reason-declineneighborhood-crimes-calls [https://perma.cc/3QY2-YYRK].
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Verga, supra note 24, at 293 (discussing the vulnerability of undocumented
workers in the workplace as victims of wage theft).
233. See id. at 293–94 (suggesting the lack of a rule regarding non-enforcement of
immigration laws “inevitably silences immigrant crime victims and witnesses”).
234. See WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, About Us, supra note 138 (describing their
organizational work as part of a national movement against wage theft).
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wage workers by opening offices in Dallas and Houston.235 More
recently, in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, organizations tailored
emergency resources to prevent wage-theft.236
While laws like S.B. 4 are meant to drive out undocumented
immigrants, the result will affect Texans beyond the immigrant
community.237 All low-wage employees are working under the same
inferior working conditions that undocumented workers labor in.238
Without a labor law reform that incorporates the protection of
undocumented immigrant workers, and vice versa, employers will have
no incentive to follow labor laws.239
IV. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION AND LABOR LAW REFORM:
A VIABLE SOLUTION TO WAGE-THEFT IN LOW-INCOME OCCUPATIONS
A. Why Temporary Legal Status Will Not Work
In the past, the U.S. Government has addressed the issue of
immigration and domestic labor shortages with a comprehensive
regulatory effort.240 For example, the Mexican Farm Labor Program
Agreement, also known as the Bracero Program of 1942, permitted
Mexican citizens to work in the U.S. agriculture industry.241 The
235. See id. (describing Workers Defense Project’s roots in Austin and highlighting its
growing influence across Texas).
236. See Hurricane Harvey Resources, HOUS. IMMIGR. LEGAL SERV. COLLABORATIVE,
https://www.houstonimmigration.org/ (last visited Jan. 22. 2017) (providing temporary legal aid to
post-Harvey workers in Houston); see also Harvey Recovery Workers Rights Attorney,
WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, http://www.workersdefense.org/harvey-recovery-workers-rightsattorney/ [https://perma.cc/NT4W-58XP] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (advertising a new attorney
position dedicated to protecting post-Harvey workers’ rights, implying a growth in demand of said
services).
237. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 11 (concluding that preserving jobs employing
undocumented individuals is essential to Texas’ long-term economic growth and prominence in the
national economy).
238. See id.
239. Id. at 22 (showing that although the effects of wage-theft on construction workers can
be devastating, employers committing the crime are not affected in the slightest).
240. The Bracero Program, UCLA LAB. CTR., https://www.labor.ucla.edu/what-wedo/labor-studies/research-tools/the-bracero-program/ [https://perma.cc/RL2W-D8EU] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2018).
241. See Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker Programs in the United States, 10 TEX.
HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 79, 84 (2004) (describing some of the process employed to permit Mexican
workers to seasonally cross the border along with protections granted to them by the federal
government).
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Program alleviated two problems: 1) it managed the migration of
Mexicans into the United States, and 2) solved the U.S labor shortage due
to the number of working-age men fighting in World War II.242
However, despite being in the country lawfully, Mexican workers under
the Bracero Program still suffered from wage-theft and other issues, such
as poor living conditions and discrimination.243
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is a more recent
example of how immigration reform has a direct impact on the labor
field.244 Approximately 20% of DACA recipients work in health care
and education—two industries already suffering from a labor
shortage.245 As a result, DACA recipients have made large contributions
to the Social Security and Medicare fund.246
In both the Bracero and DACA programs, immigration laws sought to
protect immigrants, which ultimately had a positive effect on the labor
market.247 However, temporary programs like DACA have proven to be
ineffective in light of the fact that they can easily be revoked, displacing
any positive impact the program may have had.248
242. Id. at 83–84
243. Id. at 84, n.12 (blaming exploitation on the lack of government oversight over
employers).
244. Nicholson, supra note 127 (summarizing the economic benefits of DACA, including
large sums of contributions to the Social Security and Medicare fund from income).
245. Noam Scheiber & Rachel Abrams, What Older Americans Stand to Lose if ‘Dreamers’
Are Deported, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/business/
economy/daca-dreamers-home-health-care.html [https://nyti.ms/2xbo9fW].
246. Jose Magaña-Salgado, Money on the Table: The Economic Cost of Ending DACA,
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 6-7 (Dec. 2016), https://www.ilrc.org/report-daca-economiccost [https://perma.cc/HMT3-QP5R] (calculating DACA recipients’ contributions to the Social
Security and Medicare funds).
247. See Francesc Ortega, The Economic Gains from Legalizing DREAMers, ECONOFACT
(Jan.
23,
2018),
http://econofact.org/the-economic-gains-from-legalizing-dreamers
[https://perma.cc/2H2L-Q3HB] (stating the DACA and Bracero programs resulted in lower
unemployment rates and, moreover, had fewer negative effects on the wages or employment
opportunities of native-born workers).
248. See VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RES. SERV. EXECUTIVE ORDERS:
ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 7–8 (2014) https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2271&context=key_workplace (detailing various revocations of past
presidential executive orders by sitting presidents); see also Ike Brannon & Logan Albright, The
Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA, CATO INST. (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/economic-fiscal-impact-repealing-daca [https://perma.cc/N7VV-5P4G]
(estimating a $60 billion cost to deport existing DACA recipients over the next ten years, in addition
to a loss of $280 billion in economic growth over the same time period).
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While many claim the nation was on the verge of comprehensive
immigration reform for undocumented immigrants living in the United
States in 2001, the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 left the political
climate drastically off balance.249 Immigration reform was the last thing
Americans considered safe in post-September 11th era.250 Those
opposing immigration reform argued that opening legal immigration
would make it easier for terrorists to repeat similar attacks.251 Current
legislation signaling a return to restrictive immigration policy embodies
an overt “Hispanophobia.”252 Such bias was on display in rhetoric
deployed by Republican candidates during the 2016 presidential
campaign.253
B. Permanent Legalization of Undocumented Workers and
Enforcement of Labor Laws
Temporary programs that do not offer secure legal status to Texas’s
workers have thus far failed. Anti-immigrant initiatives, such as S.B. 4
calling for mass deportation of undocumented immigrants only serve to
threaten and target low-income undocumented workers. The solution to
protecting both the undocumented and low-income community is a
collaboration between both immigration law and labor law reform.254
Activists have proposed comprehensive immigration reform and more
efficient labor enforcement.255 But, to protect immigrant workers from
wage-theft, the solution must prohibit employers from threatening their
249. Laque, supra note 28, at 29 (estimating that in the first half of 2007, over 1,400 state
bills were filed on immigration issues alone; virtually none of which treated immigration issues
from terroristic concerns).
250. See id. at 32 (suggesting the 9/11 terrorist attack “blurred the lines between
immigration and terrorism”).
251. See id. (“Since 9/11, policies regarding terrorism have misappropriated immigration
laws to promote anti-terrorism goals. As a result, immigration policy has lost its independent policy
agenda.”)
252. Nill, supra note 92, at 43 (explaining that Hispanophobia is the fear of Latinos and
Latin culture, and is easily utilized to generate opposition of immigration because of how closely
Latin culture is intertwined with immigration to the United States).
253. See Zahra Barnes, Trump’s Office for Victims of Crime by Immigrants Ignores a Key
Fact, SELF (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.self.com/story/trump-immigration-crime-voice
[https://perma.cc/R9BN-LHUY] (quoting then presidential candidate Donald Trump: “when
Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists.”).
254. Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 446.
255. Id. at 444–45.
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workers with deportation by providing a permanent road towards
legalization of undocumented workers. Out of fear of deportation,
employees will not report wage-theft claims thereby hindering the benefit
of increasing the number of investigators, the amount in penalties
employers could face, and the number of jurisdictions willing to enforce
the investigators’ findings and maximum penalties. Additionally, antiimmigration laws facilitating deportation further limit the benefit of any
such labor reform.
One of the most recent attempts to strengthen labor laws was the
proposed 2017 Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act.256 The
proposed legislation addresses three important barriers preventing
workers from recovering wages: the bill 1) amends the FLSA test by
doubling the amount awarded for unpaid wages and overtime; 2) directs
the DOL to refer cases involving certain offenders to the Department of
Justice for criminal prosecution; and 3) begins a new fund through the
WHD that awards grants to eligible entities that assist in enforcing the
wage and hour laws.257 The problem with this Act is that it still fails to
shield the most vulnerable population from employer retaliation:
undocumented immigrants.258 The Act increases a penalty rate for a
rarely-employed punishment,259 expects the DOJ will punish a crime
rarely prosecuted,260 and distributes funding to entities undocumented
immigrants are afraid to seek refuge from out of fear of deportation.
An earlier attempt to protect immigrant workers from wage-theft was
the Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation Act (POWER
Act), introduced in 2011.261 The POWER Act aimed to protect
immigrant workers from reprisals of deportation in the event they chose
to report a labor law violation.262 However, the POWER Act fails to

256. Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act, H.R. 3467, 115th Cong. (2017).
257. Id.; see also Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 445.
258. Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 436.
259. E.g. Ross, supra note 19, at 152 (quoting TWC investigator that acknowledged that
their policy avoided imposing penalties even when the employer demonstrated they committed
wage-theft in bad faith).
260. See Verga, supra note 24, at 292 (noting that one of the hardships prosecutors and law
enforcement face is not having proper training in investigating wage theft crimes).
261. Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation Act, H.R. 2169, 112th Cong.
(2011).
262. Id.
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address many of the issues closely related to wage-theft.263 For example,
the POWER Act does not address a workers’ lack of knowledge of their
right to be paid, earn a minimum wage, earn overtime, and for some, earn
a specific rate.264 Returning to our example, if Rosa were to demand
payment and her employer responded by threatening to call ICE, Rosa
would risk deportation when first filing her wage claim, and only after
her employer retaliates will the POWER Act step in to provide her
protection, assuming she even qualifies.265
Each of these solutions are one-sided.266 They reform labor laws
while proposing base-level protection to undocumented workers despite
the fact that those most vulnerable to wage-theft are undocumented.267
The solution to wage-theft among unauthorized workers therefore must
include comprehensive immigration reform.268 Without immigration
reform that creates a path to legal status, any attempt at labor reform will
still have to overcome the problem of enforcement.269
V. CONCLUSION
Supporters of S.B. 4 claim their goal is to reduce crime by broadening
the local law enforcement’s ability to enforce Federal immigration
laws.270 But many, including local law enforcement, do not believe S.B.
4 will make Texas safer.271 Ultimately, laws, such as S.B. 4, make it
easier for employers to commit wage-theft crimes and misclassification

263. See id. (omitting content that would address overarching concerns associated with
combating perpetual wage-theft).
264. See id. (failing to provide any language addressing the concerns described).
265. Id. § 2(b) (listing requirements for application of temporary protection provided by the
Secretary of Homeland Security).
266. See Verga, supra note 24, at 286–88 (describing the drawbacks of the many available,
albeit one-sided, solutions to combat wage-theft).
267. See, e.g. Arjun Sethi & Vijay Das, Protect Undocumented Workers Who Fight Abusive
Employers, AL JAZEERA (June 12, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/6/protectundocumented-workers-who-fight-abusive-employers.html
[https://perma.cc/5RZG-NMWB]
(noting that prior immigration bills were ineffective and ultimately created a second-class
workforce of exploited workers).
268. Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft & the Degradation
of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 71, 127 (2016) (arguing that the goals
of the anti-wage-theft movement can be reached by laws providing worker empowerment).
269. Verga, supra note 24, at 286.
270. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F.Supp.3d 744, 756 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
271. Limón & Wilonsky, supra note 8.
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because it contributes to undocumented immigrants’ fear of deportation
and mistrust in local law enforcement.272 Although employers can be
arrested for wage-theft, only a handful of employers are ever indicted.273
As a result, all workers in low-income occupations are at risk of
becoming victims of wage-theft because employers have little incentive
to abide by labor laws that are rarely enforced.274
Success in recovering wages by filing a wage claim with the TWC or
DOL is minimal.275 These agencies have been largely unsuccessful
because 1) workers do not know they exist, and 2) the lack of resources
within the agencies themselves.276 The first factor makes it easy for
employers to take advantage of their employees. The second factor takes
away any incentive for employers to self-correct since penalties are not
being enforced.
Undocumented workers are legally entitled to the same wage
protections as documented workers.277 Yet, undocumented workers are
more likely to suffer from wage-theft because employers use the threat of
deportation as a method of retaliation to avoid paying wages owed.
Although undocumented workers are the most vulnerable to wage-theft
and other workplace violations, all workers run an increased risk of
suffering from these violations. Lawful workers are facing some of the
same obstacles undocumented workers are facing, including hazardous
working conditions, poverty-level wages, lack of training, and dead-end
jobs without benefits.
Labor agencies have tried to reconcile the disconnect between
immigration laws and labor laws by extending protection to immigrant
272. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 3.
273. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 268, at 120.
274. See Kriston Capps, Texas Cities Haul the State to Court Over Immigration, CITY LAB
(Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/texas-cities-take-the-state-to-court-overanti-sanctuary-law-sb4/531684/ [https://perma.cc/8AK3-8RUD] (noting that S.B. 4 will exacerbate
workplace problems such as wage-theft and physical danger).
275. Ross, supra note 19, at 151 (illustrating a time frame of the TWC Wage Claim Process,
and warning that even if a claim goes to the Collection Department, the TWC cannot guarantee any
funds will actually be recovered).
276. PRICE ET AL., supra note 23, at 29.
277. See WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #48, supra note 21 (clarifying the DOL will
enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which requires employers to pay covered employees
the federal minimum wage and time and a half for overtime hours, despite the employees’
immigration status); see also TEX. L. HELP, supra note 21 (noting that undocumented workers are
covered by the Texas Payday Law).
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workers through policies and legislation. However, current labor laws
are not protecting undocumented workers. Simply put: employers of
low-wage occupations lack the incentive to create “good” jobs as current
labor legislation is not being enforced.
Arizona is an example of how closely immigration laws can influence
the workplace.278 Arizona’s LAWA and S.B. 1070 serves as an example
of how anti-immigrant legislation that isolates entire sectors of the
population fails to benefit anyone.279 LAWA and S.B 1070 manipulated
the labor market and created devastating results to Arizona’s
economy.280 Economic motive is a prime reason undocumented
immigrants cross the border and employers use this to their advantage
when hiring for low-wage occupations.281 After risking their lives and
financially investing in journeying to the United States, undocumented
workers would rather have their right to earned wages be violated than
risk deportation.282 Legislation should not allow employers who are
motivated by their own economic interests to escape liability for such
extortion. Revocable and temporary efforts to simultaneously address
immigration and labor issues are ineffective and not sustainable. The
solution to protecting both the undocumented community and the
documented community in low-income occupations is a permanent
reform effort addressing both immigration law and labor law.283 Only
by removing this vulnerability will working conditions improve for all
low-wage employees.

278. Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws, supra note 109,
at 4 (explaining that due to the high number of immigrant workers in the agriculture and
construction industries, these industries suffered the most from anti-immigrant laws).
279. Id. at 9.
280. Id.
281. See Massey & Espinosa, supra note 182, at 957 (identifying income-security as one of
the three leading forces in promoting Mexican migration).
282. See Bryce Covert, Houston is Being Rebuilt on a Foundation of Wage Theft; IN THESE
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), http://inthesetimes.com/article/20815/the-exploitation-after-the-storm
[https://perma.cc/KU79-KKDH] (describing the time a day laborer in Houston “was driven to a job
site far away and left stranded there without being paid. When he tracked down the man who hired
him, he was shot in the arm and stomach. He survived—and is still showing up looking for work.”).
283. Fine & Lyon, supra note 20, at 444–45.
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